In Arista Networks v. Cisco Systems, the Federal Circuit held that assignor estoppel has no place in inter partes review (IPR).
As background, assignor estoppel prevents a party who assigns a patent to another from later challenging the validity of the assigned patent. Further, assignor estoppel prevents parties in privity with the assignor (e.g., a company founded by the assignor) from challenging validity. An IPR is a proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board for challenging the validity of any issued US patent.
Cisco had sued its competitor Arista for patent infringement of the claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,340,597 ("the '597 patent"), Method and Apparatus for Securing a Communications Device using a Logging Module, owned by Cisco. Arista petition for an IPR, and after instituting the IPR, the PTAB invalidated certain claims. Cisco argued assignor estoppel should prevent Arista challenging the validity in the IPR, because Dr. Cheriton the Arista co-founder had previously assigned the '597 patent to Cisco.
The Federal Circuit questioned did Congress intend for assignor estoppel to apply in IPR in the following manner:
"Cisco's primary argument in favor of applying assignor estoppel is that assignor estoppel is a well-established common-law doctrine that should be presumed to apply absent a statutory indication to the contrary. With this principle in mind, Cisco particularly takes issue with the Board's reasoning that Congress would have expressly provided for application of equitable defenses if it so desired.
There is some merit to Cisco's argument. In Westinghouse, the Court characterized assignor estoppel as "a rule well settled by 45 years of judicial consideration and conclusion" in the district and circuit courts, reaching back as early as 1880. Westinghouse, 266 U.S. at 349; see also Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 260 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The principle of fair dealing as between assignor and assignee of a patent whereby the assignor will not be allowed to say that what he sold as a patent was not a patent had been part of the fabric of our law throughout the life of this nation."). But, in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the Supreme Court appeared to cast some doubt on the doctrine's continued viability. 395 U.S. 653, 664-66 (1969). And although this court has held that the doctrine survived Lear, we did so recognizing that court decisions post-Lear "reveal[ed] some uncertainty about the continued vitality of the doctrine." Diamond Sci., 848 F.2d at 1223; see also id. ("Although Lear involved the licensing, rather than the assignment, of a patent, the opinion reviewed the history of `patent estoppel' in general, and indicated that the Court's previous decisions had sapped much of the vitality, if not the logic, from the assignment estoppel doctrine as well.").
With this history in mind, we recognize that "Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles." Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991). "Thus, where a common-law principle is well established, . . . the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except `when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)); see also Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017). But see United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 288 (2002) ("The common-law rule was not so well established . . . that we must assume that Congress considered the impact of its enactment on the question now before us."). But even assuming that assignor estoppel could be considered such a well-established common law principle, we nonetheless conclude that, here, "a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 (quoting Isbrandtsen, 343 U.S. at 783). In particular, we view § 311(a) as governing the question of whether Congress intended assignor estoppel to apply in the IPR context.13
Section 311(a) states, in relevant part: "(a) In General.—Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent. . . ." § 311(a) (emphasis added).
Arista contends that § 311(a) unambiguously leaves no room for assignor estoppel in the IPR context, given that the statute allows any person "who is not the owner of a patent" to file an IPR.14 We agree. Where "the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms." King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); see also Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010). In our view, the plain language of this statutory provision is unambiguous.
Cisco contends that this statute does not directly speak to the question of assignor estoppel in IPRs. Instead, Cisco views § 311(a) as reflecting two principles: first, that an IPR must begin as an adversarial proceeding, rather than as a means for a patent owner to confirm the patentability of certain claims; and second, that there is no Article III-like standing requirement for filing an IPR. In our view, however, the statute, by its terms, does more—it delineates who may file an IPR petition. The plain language of § 311(a) demonstrates that an assignor, who is no longer the owner of a patent, may file an IPR petition as to that patent.
This conclusion is consistent with Congress's express incorporation of equitable doctrines in other related contexts. For example, a statute governing International Trade Commission investigations states that "[a]ll legal and equitable defenses may be presented in all cases." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (providing in the Lanham Act context that "[i]n all inter partes proceedings equitable principles of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, where applicable may be considered and applied"). And although such express inclusion of equitable defenses in other contexts is not dispositive of the issue presented in this case, it is further evidence of congressional intent.
Finally, Cisco contends that allowing assignor estoppel in other forums, such as in the ITC and in district court, while not allowing it in the IPR context creates an inconsistency that invites forum shopping. We, however, do not view this as an inconsistency, but rather as an intentional congressional choice. Such a discrepancy between forums—one that follows from the language of the respective statutes—is consistent with the overarching goals of the IPR process that extend beyond the particular parties in a given patent dispute. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 ("[I]nter partes review helps protect the public's `paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.'" (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945))). Moreover, any policy choices regarding forum shopping are better left to Congress than to this court. Cf. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358 ("Policy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court."); Click-to-Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d 1321, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Taranto, J., concurring) ("If there turns out to be a problem in the statute's application according to its plain meaning, it is up to Congress to address the problem.").
In sum, we conclude that § 311(a), by allowing "a person who is not the owner of a patent" to file an IPR, unambiguously dictates that assignor estoppel has no place in IPR proceedings."
Copyright © 2018 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.
