Showing posts with label infringement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label infringement. Show all posts

Saturday, August 29, 2020

RPX - Infringement Is the Top District Court Issue Appealed to the Federal Circuit

RPX published a nice summary on what US patent issues are appealed to the Federal Circuit:

"RPX data on the Federal Circuit show that infringement is the most common issue appealed from district court patent cases, appearing in over 450 appeals. Claim construction and invalidity (under Sections 102/103/112) are the next two most frequent issues, each of which appears in over 300 appeals. Two other key issues round out the top five: damages/fees/costs (appearing in around 275 appeals) and invalidity under Alice/Section 101 (just over 240 appeals)."

Note the low reversal rates of many issues appealed point to the importance of winning at trial. As Judge Rich might say, "the name of the game is the claim."

For more detail: RPX Infringement Is the Top District Court Issue Appealed to the Federal Circuit

Copyright © 2020 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Sunday, November 18, 2018

US Supreme Court - WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp. - Damages for Patent Infringing Exports

In WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., the US Supreme Court held that "under the Patent Act, a company can be liable for patent infringement if it ships components of a patented invention overseas to be assembled there." See 35 U. S. C. §271(f)(2). The Court stated under 35 U.S.C. §284  "a patent owner who proves infringement under this provision is entitled to recover damages" and held the patent owner should recover its lost foreign profits ($90 Million).

Copyright © 2018 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Tuesday, March 7, 2017

US Supreme Court - Life Technologies v. Promega - Supplying a Single Component Abroad Doesn't Infringe US Patent Under 35 USC 271(f)(1)

In Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held supplying a single component abroad for manufacture of a product with multiple components does not infringe a U.S. patent under 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1). This reverses the Federal Circuit decision, and disagrees with the qualitative argument that a single component can be a "substantial portion" of the components supplied resulting in infringement.

For details and an insightful analysis by Professor John Duffy see SCOTUS Blog.

Copyright © 2017 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

Supreme Court - Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems - Belief of Patent Invalidity No Defense to Induced Infringement Claim

In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, the US Supreme Court held that a defendant's belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to a claim it induced infringement.

Commil USA, LLC, the owner of a patent relating to a method of implementing wireless networks, had sued Cisco Systems, Inc., for making and selling wireless networking equipment that directly infringed and for inducing others to infringe the patent by selling them infringing equipment.

Cisco was found liable for direct and induced infringement, but had raised the defense to induced infringement that it had a good-faith belief Commil’s patent was invalid. The trial court ruled evidence to show the belief inadmissible. On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated the trial court erred in excluding Cisco’s evidence of its good-faith belief.

The Supreme Court has had a pattern of reversing the Federal Circuit in recent years, and this case was no different. It held a defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to a claim of induced infringement. Induced infringement under 35 U. S. C. §271(b) only applies when a defendant knew of the patent and that the induced acts constitute infringement. Similarly, contributory infringement under 35 USC §271(c) requires knowledge of the patent and knowledge of patent infringement.

This contrasts with direct infringement under 35 USC §271(a), which is a matter of strict liability where the defendant’s mental state is irrelevant.

The Supreme Court reminded that Global-Tech requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement and that the defendant's actions demonstrated it knew it would be causing customers to infringe patent.

The Supreme Court said induced infringement and validity are separate defenses, and said it was unwilling to undermine the presumption that a patent is valid under 35 USC §282(a) proof otherwise must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership.

The Supreme Court noted accused inducers who believe a patent is invalid can seek ex parte reexamination of the patent by the USPTO and that district courts can dissuade frivolous suits by sanctioning attorneys, e.g., under Rule 11 or awarding attorney fees under 35 USC 285.

Copyright © 2015 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Thursday, April 2, 2015

US Supreme Court - Oral Argument Transcript Commil USA v. Cisco Systems

The US Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems.

The issue in Commil USA: Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant's belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).

Here's a PDF copy of the transcript of the oral arguments.

Copyright © 2015 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Friday, March 27, 2015

US Supreme Court - Oral Arguments in Kimble v. Marvel and Commil USA v. Cisco Systems on March 31

On March 31, the US Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the patent cases: Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises and Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems.

The issue in Commil USA: Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant's belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).

The issue in Kimble: Whether this Court should overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., which held that "a patentee's use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se."

The SCOTUS blog will be live blogging the oral arguments at 9:45 am ET.

Copyright © 2015 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Saturday, December 6, 2014

Supreme Court - Commil USA, LLC. v. Cisco Systems - Is Defendant's Good Faith Belief of Patent Invalidity A Defense to Induced Infringement?

Yesterday, the US Supreme Court granted Commil's petition for certiorari to review the Federal Circuit decision in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems Inc.. There the Federal Circuit held a defendant's good-faith belief a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 USC § 271(b). The Federal Circuit stated it could "see no principled distinction between a good-faith belief of invalidity and a good faith belief of non-infringement for the purpose of whether a defendant possessed the specific intent to induce infringement of a patent."

Generally, a defendant can be liable for actively inducing (encouraging) infringement: (1) if the party induced directly infringes a patent claim; and (2) if the defendant has specific, knowing intent to encourage infringement of the patent claim which is more than intent to cause acts later held to infringe. Intent can be proven through circumstantial evidence or deliberate indifference to a known risk a patent exists.

Cisco Systems' brief in opposition

Solicitor General's brief

Copyright © 2014 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Wednesday, October 15, 2014

Osborn - Ripple Effects in the Law: The Broadening Meaning of An “Offer To Sell" in Patent Law

Tonight, I recommend Professor Lucas Osborn's Ripple Effects in the Law: The Broadening Meaning of An “Offer To Sell” In Patent Law published in the Stanford Technology Law Review in 2014.

Despite the title, this article is not about the on sale bar. It's about infringing offers that can produce liability. As background, infringement occurs when someone makes, uses, offers to sell, or imports the patented invention during the term in the US without the owner's permission.

Currently, the infringing offer has to meet the contract definition of an offer. I think this is most workable standard in most cases, but the article argues for a broader definition. Here's the abstract: "The law's complexity is such that even apparently minor changes can have numerous 'ripple' effects. This Article examines the ripple effects from a potential broadening of patent law's definition of an infringing 'offer to sell.' Currently, courts limit 'offers' to formal, contract-law offers; but a policy analysis suggests that 'offers' should include advertisements and other promotions, which harm patentees via price erosion. Changing the offer definition to include advertisements and other promotions requires a careful consideration of the effects, including effects on patent litigation, innovation incentives, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law, third-party liability, and Constitutional concerns. This Article performs that analysis and provides specific recommendations for crafting the definition of an infringing 'offer' to sell."

Copyright © 2014 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Monday, March 17, 2014

Federal Circuit - Verderi v. Google - District Court's Claim Construction Error Vacates Non-Infringement Judgment

In Verderi, LLC v. Google, Inc., the Federal Circuit vacated a judgment of non-infringement of four U.S. patents owned by Verderi, LLC because the district court erred in claim construction.

On October 15, 2010, Vederi LLC sued Google alleging Google Street View infringed U.S. Patent No. 7,239,760U.S. Patent No. 7,577,316U.S. Patent No. 7,805,025, and U.S. Patent No. 7,813,596 describe methods for creating synthesized images of a geographic area that can be displayed on a computer.

As background, Google Street View produces images and view that are curved or spherical, and never flat because it combines images of a wide range of views recorded by multiple cameras having wide-angle lenses mounted on a moving vehicle. Those photographs are overlapping pictures taken from a single location at approximately the same time. These images are stitched together into a virtual spherical composite image. The resulting image is a two-dimensional representation of a spherical shape.

Claim 1 of the '760 patent is representative of the claims:

1. In a system including an image source and a user terminal having a screen and an input device, a method for enabling visual navigation of  geographic area from the user terminal, the method comprising:
  • receiving a first user input specifying a first location in the geographic area;
  • retrieving from the image source a first image associated with the first location, the image source providing a plurality of images depicting views of objects in the geographic area, the views being substantially elevations of the objects in the geographic area, wherein the images are associated with image frames acquired by an image recording device moving along a trajectory;
  • receiving a second user input specifying a navigation direction relative to the first location in the geographic area;
  • determining a second location based on the user specified navigation direction; and
  • retrieving from the image source a second image associated with the second location (emphasis added).
In the Markman hearing, Google argued "views being substantially elevations of the objects" in claim 1 required "vertical flat (as opposed to curved or spherical) depictions of front or side views." Verderi stated that it merely meant "front and side views of the objects." The district court stated the patents "did not disclose anything about spherical views" and entered summary judgment in favor of Google.

The Federal Circuit stated when it interprets claims it relies primarily on intrinsic evidence: the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history and apart from the claims, the specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a claim term. After considering the intrinsic evidence, a court may seek guidance from extrinsic evidence, but should understand it may be less reliable than intrinsic evidence (quotations and citation omitted).

The Federal Circuit noted that the district court erred by not relying the intrinsic evidence: (1) the claims broadly recited "substantially elevations," but the court adopted an architect's strict definition of an elevation view, which read "substantially" out of the claims; (2) Figure 16 of the patents depicted buildings with depth and perspective not just front and side, which is more than an elevation view; and (3) The specification described taking a photo with a fish-eye lens, which produces photos which are not flat and not an elevation. 

After reading the opinion, I think the specification was contrary to Google's "substantially elevations" = "flat images" argument at the Markman hearing so the decision was not surprising. On the other hand, using a relative term such as "substantially" in a claim is not risk free as it may raise an indefiniteness defense.

Copyright © 2014 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC - A Patent Owner Must Prove Infringement in Declaratory Judgment Action

Today, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, the Supreme Court held when a licensee files a declaratory judgment action that products don't infringe a licensed patent, the patent owner must prove infringement.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the Court and framed the question: "A patent licensee paying royalties into an escrow account under a patent licensing agreement seeks a declaratory judgment that some of its products are not covered by or do not infringe the patent, and that it therefore does not owe royalties for those products. In that suit, who bears the burden of proof, or, to be more precise, the burden of persuasion? Must the patentee prove infringement or must the licensee prove non-infringement?

The Court asserted legal logic supports "the burden of persuasion is with the patentee, just as it would be had the patentee brought an infringement suit." He stated it is well established that the burden of proving infringement rests upon the patent owner. The Declaratory Judgment Act is only procedural while the burden of proof is a rule of substantive law.

The Court also noted shifting the burden to the licensee could create uncertainty about the scope of the patent. Suppose an alleged infringer lost the declaratory judgment action because the evidence was inconclusive on non-infringement, the alleged infringer might continue in the same conduct, forcing the patent owner to file an infringement action. If the burden shifted, the patent owner might fail to prove infringement if the evidence was inconclusive. As a result nobody would know what products infringe. Thus, the declaratory judgment suit would not provide "an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties."

The Court stated to shift the burden would make it difficult for the licensee to understand the patent owner's infringement claim, which the patent owner would be in a better position to know, while the alleged infringer would have to argue against every infringement theory.

The Court emphasized that burden shifting to the licensee is difficult to reconcile with the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate the dilemma posed by putting one who challenges a patent's scope to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking suit.

The Court was not persuaded by contrary arguments. It noted the Federal Circuit's lacked support in Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005), since it was not a declaratory judgment case. It said the Federal Circuit's position that the holding applied only in the limited circumstances did not change the fact those circumstances are often present. The Court noted the patent owner started the dispute in response to the concern a licensee could force a patent owner into patent litigation.

The Court concluded the public interest didn't favor imposing the burden of proving infringement upon the licensee, since the public interest has a "paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope."

Copyright © 2014 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Thursday, January 16, 2014

US Supreme Court Certiorari - SAP America v. Versata Software - Software Patent Infringement, Expert Testimony, and Denial of Stay of Litigation Based on PTAB Invalidity Decision

Today, Mary Pat Dwyer of the SCOTUS Blog stated the petition of the day relates to the Federal Circuit's decision in SAP America, Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc.

SAP, the petitioner and defendant below, frame the issue as follows: (1) Whether a computer software manufacturer may be liable for direct infringement of a patent drawn to computer instructions where the software, as shipped, does not contain sufficient instructions to perform the claimed operations; (2) whether flaws in an expert’s methodology may be raised as part of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or only to the testimony’s admissibility; and (3) whether a patent infringement action should be stayed where the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has declared invalid all patent claims at issue in the infringement action and the defendant, which sought such review at the first opportunity, might otherwise be compelled to pay an enormous damages judgment and be subjected to a permanent injunction on the basis of the invalid claims.

Versata Software, the respondent and patent owner, frame the issue as follows: (1) Whether both courts below erred in ruling that the trial record supported the jury’s factual determination that SAP’s software and source code, as shipped, met every limitation of the asserted patent claims without modification by the customer; (2) whether the Federal Circuit properly declined to address challenges to the expert’s methodology insofar as they were framed as challenges to admissibility where SAP conceded it was not challenging the testimony’s admissibility on methodological grounds and had waived any such challenge below; and (3) whether the Federal Circuit was required to stay this patent infringement action under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act where SAP did not seek a stay until after the Federal Circuit had issued its opinion on the merits, and the four statutory factors each weigh against the requested stay.

Whether or not the Supreme Court hears this case, the message I am hearing is delay in requesting a stay may negate a major benefit (e.g., erasing $330M in damages) of a PTAB decision holding the patent invalid. 

See the papers, orders, and proceedings at SCOTUS blog page.

Copyright © 2014 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Friday, January 10, 2014

Supreme Court Grants Review of Joint Infringement in Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies

On January 10, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the Federal Circuit regarding the issue of joint infringement in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.

As background this case involves U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (the '703 patent), which relates to storing web pages at the content provider (web site) and storing their embedded objects at another domain closer to the client. This is one of inventor Daniel Lewins' contributions to the Web: store popular web pages at the web site so hits can be tracked, but store their embedded objects at domains closer to the browsers to reduce page latency.

Claim 19 of the '703 patent recites a content delivery service, comprising:
  • replicating a set of page objects across a wide area network of content servers managed by a domain other than a content provider domain;
  • for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, tagging the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the page objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain;
  • responsive to a request for the given page received at the content provider domain, serving the given page from the content provider domain; and
  • serving at least one embedded object of the given page from a given content server in the domain instead of from the content provider domain.
Joint infringement arose in this case because direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) requires a single entity perform all of steps of the process claim. Limelight performed all the steps of claim 19 except for the step of "tagging the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the page objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain," which it encouraged customers perform.

Perhaps Limelight thought given the law that it might escape infringement, because no single entity performed all of the steps as required for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). In the past, liability for inducement of infringement 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) required a direct infringer. Nonetheless, Akamai successfully argued before the Federal Circuit that inducement did not require a direct infringer as long as a single entity induces the infringement such that all of the steps are performed by multiple entities.

So now the parties frame the issues this way: patent owners Akamai and MIT state the issue is whether a party may be liable for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) or § 271(b) when two or more entities perform all of the steps of a process claim. Accused infringer Limelight Networks states the issue is whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed direct infringement under § 271(a).

The SCOTUS blog has more information at Limelight Networks, Inc. Akamai Technologies, Inc. and Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. regarding the proceedings, orders, and parties briefs. Also see Lisa McElroy of the SCOTUS blog for details on what a CVSG means in a non-US government case: "CVSG" in plain English

This case will impact the value of US patents relating to distributed computing (e.g., cloud computing).

Copyright © 2014 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Friday, December 27, 2013

Google DJ Action of Noninfringement of Rockstar Patents

Alan Cooper and Suzie Lipton sent email that I should consider giving some coverage to what is going on with Google's counter-suit against the Rockstar consortium patents this week.

As most know, Rockstar consortium is a patent holding company that includes as shareholders Apple, Microsoft, and RIM that outbid Google to purchase patents from the bankrupt telecom company Nortel for $4.5 billion. Media suspects Apple and Microsoft are using the Rockstar patents as a proxy to attack the Android ecosystem. Also rumored is the patents are not worth what many bidders thought and some are even up for sale.

There are many articles on this topic, and rumors make it  difficult to know what is true. Part of the problem is the reporting from even stellar journalists mixes up even the basic terminology.

For example, in Google files counter-suit against Rockstar, seeking to avoid East Texas we were told "Rockstar Consortium, a patent-holding company formed from the bankrupt Canadian telecom company Nortel, sued Google and manufacturers of Android phones over patents almost two months ago" and "this week Google filed its counter-attack seeking to invalidate Rockstar's patents" (emphasis added).

I enjoy Mr. Mullin's contributions so I read the article, but found Google's complaint mentioned in the article was not seeking to invalidate Rockstar's patents. Instead, Google filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment of Non-Infringement for each of seven patents. It's not that the patent claims shouldn't have issued for invalidity; it's the patent claims don't describe Google's products or processes.

When much happens behind the scenes and one of my favorite journalists doesn't get the facts straight, you need to delve into the original sources of authority and/or wonder if it is not smarter to await further developments.

Copyright © 2013 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Monday, June 24, 2013

Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. - US Supreme Court Calls for Solicitor General's Views on Petition for Certiorari on Joint Infringement Standard

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a call for the views of the Solicitor General (CVSG) on whether or not to grant the petition for certiorari to consider the issue of joint infringement in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. 

As background this case involves U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (the '703 patent), which relates to storing web pages at the content provider (web site) and storing their embedded objects at another domain closer to the client. This is one of inventor Daniel Lewins' contributions to the Web: store popular web pages at the web site so hits can be tracked, but store their embedded objects at domains closer to the browsers to reduce page latency.

Claim 19 of the '703 patent recites a content delivery service, comprising:
  • replicating a set of page objects across a wide area network of content servers managed by a domain other than a content provider domain;
  • for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, tagging the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the page objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain;
  • responsive to a request for the given page received at the content provider domain, serving the given page from the content provider domain; and
  • serving at least one embedded object of the given page from a given content server in the domain instead of from the content provider domain.
Joint infringement arose in this case because direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) requires a single entity perform all of steps of the process claim. Limelight performed all the steps of claim 19 except for the step of "tagging the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the page objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain," which it encouraged customers perform.

Perhaps Limelight thought given the law that it might escape infringement, because no single entity performed all of the steps as required for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). In the past, liability for inducement of infringement 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) required a direct infringer. Nonetheless, Akamai successfully argued before the Federal Circuit that inducement did not require a direct infringer as long as a single entity induces the infringement such that all of the steps are performed by multiple entities.

So now the parties frame the issues this way: patent owners Akamai and MIT state the issue is whether a party may be liable for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) or § 271(b) when two or more entities perform all of the steps of a process claim. Accused infringer Limelight Networks states the issue is whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed direct infringement under § 271(a).

The SCOTUS blog has more information at Limelight Networks, Inc. Akamai Technologies, Inc. and Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. regarding the proceedings, orders, and parties briefs. Also see Lisa McElroy of the SCOTUS blog for details on what a CVSG means in a non-US government case: "CVSG" in plain English

It's too early to say if the Supreme Court will hear this case, but if so, it will impact the value of US patents relating to distributed computing (e.g., cloud computing).

Copyright © 2013 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Friday, June 1, 2012

Oracle v. Google - Copyright & Patent Trial - Judge Alsup Rules Oracle's 37 Java APIs Not Copyrightable

Yesterday, Judge Alsup ruled the 37 Java APIs are not copyrightable after the jury reached a partial verdict on copyright infringement. Judge Alsup stated:

"This trial showcases a distinction between copyright protection and patent protection. It is an important distinction, for copyright exclusivity lasts 95 years whereas patent exclusivity lasts twenty years. And, the Patent and Trademark Office examines applications for anticipation and obviousness before allowance whereas the Copyright Office does not. This distinction looms large where, as here, the vast majority of the code was not copied and the copyright owner must resort to alleging that the accused stole the “structure, sequence and organization” of the work. This phrase — structure, sequence and organization — does not appear in the Act or its legislative history. It is a phrase that crept into use to describe a residual property right where literal copying was absent. A question then arises whether the copyright holder is more appropriately asserting an exclusive right to a functional system, process, or method of operation that belongs in the realm of patents, not copyrights....

Under Section 102(b), copyright protection never extends to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation or concept regardless of its form. Functional elements essential for interoperability are not copyrightable....

As long as the specific code written to implement a method is different, anyone is free under the Copyright Act to write his or her own method to carry out exactly the same function or specification of any and all methods used in the Java API. Contrary to Oracle, copyright law does not confer ownership over any and all ways to implement a function or specification, no matter how creative the copyrighted implementation or specification may be.  The Act confers ownership only over the specific way in which the author wrote out his version.  Others are free to write their own implementation to accomplish the identical function, for, importantly, ideas, concepts and functions cannot be monopolized by copyright....

Much of Oracle’s evidence at trial went to show that the design of methods in an API was a creative endeavor. Of course, that is true. Inventing a new method to deliver a new output can be creative, even inventive, including the choices of inputs needed and outputs returned.  The same is true for classes. But such inventions — at the concept and functionality level — are protectable only under the Patent Act. The Patent and Trademark Office examines such inventions for validity and if the patent is allowed, it lasts for twenty years. Based on a single implementation, Oracle would bypass this entire patent scheme and claim ownership over any and all ways to carry out methods for 95 years — without any vetting by the Copyright Office of the type required for patents. This order holds that, under the Copyright Act, no matter how creative or imaginative a Java method specification may be, the entire world is entitled to use the same method specification (inputs, outputs, parameters) so long as the line-by-line implementations are different. To repeat the Second Circuit’s phrasing, “there might be a myriad of ways in which a programmer may . . . express the idea embodied in a given subroutine.” Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 708. The method specification is the idea. The method implementation is the expression. No one may monopolize the idea...."

Thus, Oracle's copyright case is finished unless the Federal Circuit reverses this ruling on appeal. Although  legal questions are considered de novo (anew), appealing from the well reasoned 41 page-order seems like a long shot. See Judge Alsup's order in the first article below and the other articles. This case reminds all of us that we must use patents rather than copyright to protect the functionality of software.

Judge Alsup Rules: Oracle's Java API's are no Copyrightable (Order as text) Groklaw

Google wins crucial API ruling, Oracle's case decimated - Joe Mullins of Ars technica

Judge says Google only used uncopyrightable elements of 37 Java APIs in Android - Florian Mueller of FOSS Patents.

Copyright cases like Oracle v Google are more controversial than software patent cases - Florian Mueller of FOSS Patents.

Copyright © 2012 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.

Wednesday, May 23, 2012

Oracle v. Google - Jury Rules No Patent Infringement

Yesterday, I read about the jury's struggle to understand the patent claims and how they apply to the Android software. For details see CNET's Oracle-Google jury stymied by more technical questions.

Today, I read the jury found no infringement. It is difficult to assess how much complexity led to this result, but whatever occurred non-infringement tends to be a potent defense. For details see Ars technica's Oracle v. Google: no patent infringement found and CNET's Jury verdict: Android doesn't infringe Oracle's patents.

Also see FOSS Patents Jury doesn't find Google to infringe two Oracle patents -- but the litigation is far from over for ramifications and a copy of the patent verdict.

Further, see Ars technica's Oracle v. Google jury foreman reveals: Oracle wasn't even close and Oracle poured millions into failed patent trial, but will fight on.

Thanks to Alan Cooper for emailing: CNNMoney Google vanquishes Oracle in Android patent fight.It's a nice summary of the case, but the title is hyperbole.

Finally, see MercuryNews.com Google Scores Victory in Battle with Oracle.

Copyright © 2012 Robert Moll. All rights reserved.